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THE BENEFITS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Douglas Laycock*
I must begin by briefly discussing both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause and the relationship between them. In
my view, they are both clauses to protect religious liberty. Together,
they protect both believers and nonbelievers. Indeed, each clause
considered separately protects both believers and nonbelievers, or
each would if it were properly interpreted. The shortest summary I
can offer is that the clauses together are designed to minimize gov-
ernment influence on religious belief and practice. By minimizing
government influence, they maximize religious liberty. Much more
than with respect to any of our other liberties, the religion clauses
are designed to make religious practice and nonpractice, belief and
nonbelief, wholly matters of private choice insulated from govern-
ment influence or control.
Much of the contribution of the Establishment Clause is that reli-
gious belief and practice are insulated even from government per-
suasion. There is no other area of our life where we say that govern-
ment cannot even try to persuade you. On political issues,
persuasion is a large part of what government does. Government
leads; government tries to mold opinion. But with respect to reli-
gious opinion, we believe that molding opinion is precisely what gov-
ernment should not do.
In too many discussions of the religion clauses, including at least
occasionally at this conference, you get a sense that each religion
clause is one side's club to beat the other side with. Among some
aggressively proselytizing religious groups you occasionally hear the
Free Exercise Clause explained as their means of maximizing their
religious influence, and the Establishment Clause as an unfortunate
inconvenience. On the other side, and far more often in academic
life, you hear the Establishment Clause referred to as the clause by
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which we keep these troublesome religious folks under control and
out of the public sphere. Each of these views is nonsense. These two
clauses, which are found in the same sentence, are not in opposition
to one another. At the big picture level, they are not even in tension
with one another, although I concede that in applying the clauses in
close cases, the hard cases, there is sometimes tension.
It is important to remember that the votes for disestablishment
came from evangelicals.' The votes came from Baptists, Presbyteri-
ans, Methodists, and Quakers. I do not mean to underestimate the
contribution of James Madison, but he alone did not have the votes.
The necessary political pressure, the demand for disestablishment,
the threat not to ratify the Constitution unless something were done
about religious liberty, came from the evangelical dissenting
churches.
I am sure about where the votes came from. I am less sure about
my next point, but I think it is more probable than not: but for the
evangelicals, Madison would not have had the motivation to pursue
religious liberty. He was influenced by the specter and the occa-
sional reality of persecution of Baptist preachers in Virginia. With-
out that experience, I am not at all sure there would be the Memo-
rial and Remonstrance2 or any of the rest that we credit to
Madison. In fact, Madison was nearly defeated for election to the
First Congress, partly because of an anti-Federalist gerrymander,
but also because he was dragging his feet on a federal bill of rights,
and religious dissenters in his district were demanding an explicit
guarantee of religious liberty.3
Under the religion clauses, as I understand them and as the Su-
preme Court has understood them, all religions are protected. But
that commitment itself entails one choice about types of religion.
There is one type of religion that cannot be fully protected. That is
the religion of those people who believe that their religious exercise
requires use of the instruments of government, either to directly im-
1. See, e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 134-37, 141, 143-46, 148-51, 156-57, 163-77, 179-83, 185-
89, 195, 198-99, 216-17 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understand-
ing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 , 1436-43 (1990).
2. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments was circulated in
1785 in response to the general assessment bill then pending in the Virginia legislature. The bill
and Memorial and Remonstrance are reprinted as an appendix to Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 63-74 (1947).
3. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 44-49 (1987); CURRY,
supra note 1, at 198-99.
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pose their belief on others or to use government in their own worship
services. This choice among types of religion is also a choice among
types of liberty. I believe that it is not simply a raw choice. It is a
principled choice, based on the view that the best you can do to
maximize religious liberty for all citizens is to prevent anyone from
using the government for religious purposes.
What then is the role of the Establishment Clause as one of this
pair of clauses to protect religious liberty? One way to view this
question is in practical lawyer terms. What does the Establishment
Clause add to the Free Exercise Clause? What abuses are forbidden
by the Establishment Clause that would not be forbidden if the Free
Exercise Clause stood alone?
Susan Gilles" and Richard Kay5 have outlined what an estab-
lished church can look like in a tolerant society under the most
favorable conditions for liberty. One can decide for oneself whether
the results are satisfactory. I tend to approach the question from the
opposite perspective. Constitutional rights do not exist to protect us
against the times when things are going well. Rather, we have con-
stitutional rights to ameliorate the times when things are going very
badly. Constitutional rights are aimed at abuses. The question then
becomes: What abuses are forbidden by the Establishment Clause
that are not forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause?
It is certainly true that constitutional clauses and judicial review
are very thin reeds to rely on. When a society is bent on abuse or
persecution, there is a great danger that judges will go along. A
sufficiently determined political majority can appoint judges who
promise not to enforce much of the Bill of Rights. Our mechanisms
for preserving minority rights and majority rule are ingenious but
fragile.
The claim that constitutional clauses do some good is not a claim
that judges are inherently better than legislators at protecting lib-
erty. Sometimes they are better; sometimes they are worse. Usually
they are about the same. The claim that the Constitution does some
good is simply the claim that two chances are better than one. Un-
like legislators, judges have to at least go through the motions of
listening to every complaint that is presented to them and of giving
4. Susan M. Gilles, "Worldly Corruptions" and "Ecclesiastical Depredations": How Bad Is
An Established Church?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 349 (1992).
5. Richard S. Kay, The-Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 361 (1992).
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principled reasons for each decision. They have some incentives to
do so, incentives in judicial tradition and in insulation from political
pressure. Some of the time, judicial review will do some good.
Judges did nothing for the Mormons,' but they may have saved the
Jehovah's Witnesses 7 and the Amish.' If judges save one religious
minority a century, I consider that ample justification for judicial
review in religious liberty cases.
I come at last to the question of what abuses might be forbidden
by the Establishment Clause that may not be forbidden by the Free
Exercise Clause. The first, and most obvious, is taxation to support
religion as religion. In Virginia by 1776, there were still some licens-
ing provisions, and Baptist ministers were occasionally hassled, but
Virginians were very close to general free exercise.9 The dissenting
churches were already allowed to function. It would have been very
easy to enact a Free Exercise Clause with no Establishment Clause.
In fact, that is what they did. The Virginia Free Exercise Clause
was enacted in 1776, and disestablishment came some time later.'"
The general assessment proposal that Madison resisted would have
continued free exercise for all but required each citizen to pay taxes
to support the religion of his choice." The historian Thomas Curry
thinks that many at the time believed that taxation to support the
church violated free exercise.' 2 He may be right, although there is
no support in the case law for that claim today.' 3 Certainly it is
easier to explain to a judge why taxation to support the church vio-
6. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
7. The Jehovah's Witness cases are collected in Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Lib-
erty in the United States, 42 OHIO ST. L. REV. 409, 419-20 (1986).
8. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at 36
(1977).
10. CURRY, supra note 1, at 135-36.
11. Id. at 136.
12. Id. at 147, 217.
13. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to
tax support for religious schools, on the ground that paying taxes to support another religion did
not violate any practice or exercise of plaintiff's religion); cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to the use of tax money to support the Social Security
system, which did violate the Amish plaintiff's religious tenets against participation in public in-
surance programs, on the ground that the government's interest in collecting taxes was compel-
ling); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (holding that the Establishment Clause is an
exception to the general rule of no standing for taxpayers to challenge government expenditures,
and that this clause operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon Congressional taxing and
spending powers; there is no similar holding under the Free Exercise Clause).
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lates the Establishment Clause than to explain why it would violate
the Free Exercise Clause.
Taxation to support education and social services delivered by
churches may or may not be distinguishable from taxation to sup-
port religion as religion.' 4 If church-sponsored education and social
services are distinguishable from the church itself, then tax-support
violates neither religion clause. If the church-sponsored education
and social services are indistinguishable from the church itself, then
the tax support violates the Establishment Clause. A free exercise
claim is much harder to make. The analysis of whether the Estab-
lishment Clause adds anything to the Free Exercise Clause with re-
spect to education and social services is analogous to the analysis of
which clause forbids taxation to support religion as religion.
A second abuse forbidden by the Establishment Clause is coerced
worship. Just as the general assessment proposal would have re-
quired everybody to pay a tax to some church, it is easy to imagine
a law that required everybody to attend some church. Such a law
might let the individual choose the church, but would require at-
tendance somewhere. In fact, that is a rule at military academies
today. Coerced worship is one way to understand school prayer; all
the students are required to participate in this little worship service.
I am assuming that in our pluralistic society, such a requirement
would at least have some elements of* nonpreferentialism. But one
can even imagine a rule that says every church can continue to
function, and you can go to your own church, as long as you also
show up at the established or preferred church once a week.
A requirement that everyone worship would violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, if properly interpreted. Just as the Speech Clause pro-
tects one's right not to speak, the Free Exercise Clause protects
one's right not to worship. I am not at all convinced, however, that
the current Supreme Court would have agreed with this, even before
Employment Division v. Smith.'5 The Court says there is no free
exercise claim unless a person is required to violate a specific and
obligatory tenet of her religious belief.'6
14. For an analysis of this possible distinction, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective
Funding Problem: Abortion and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991).
15. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that there is no constitutional
right to exemption from facially neutral and generally applicable laws that prohibit religious
practices).
16. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1990). See
also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23-28 (analyzing
19921
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Consider what the Court's rule implies for coerced worship. Sup-
pose I say: "I am a traditional Roman Catholic and I have a specific
tenet against worshiping with anyone else. And I still believe that,
even though the rest of the Catholic Church has become considera-
bly more liberal as to this tenet." If I sincerely believe this, then I
may have a free exercise claim of coerced worship at another faith's
service. But suppose I say: "I am just a nonbeliever. I do not care
about any of this stuff." Or suppose.I say: "I am a post-Vatican II
Catholic. I have no objection in principle to worshiping with other
faiths. But except on special occasions, I do not get much out of it. I
am certainly not going to give up Mass, and it is a burden to also
attend someone else's worship service every week."
In either of the latter scenarios, the current judicial response is
likely to be: "You have no specific religious tenet that says you can-
not show up and worship in someone else's church once a week as
the law requires. You have no free exercise claim. The burden of
attending two worship services every week is irrelevant, or in any
event is much less onerous than the burden of closing a store two
days a week as in Braunfeld v. Brown."'1 7 This may be the wrong
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause but, again, as with taxa-
tion, protection against coerced worship is more easily explained in
terms of the Establishment Clause.
Neither coerced worship, nor coerced tax support for religion as
religion, seems very likely in the current political environment. A
third and more real concern, as raised here by Daniel Conkle, is
noncoercive religious observances by government.18 What about gov-
ernment-sponsored worship that no one has to attend but anyone
may attend? What about government crosses, cr6ches, menorahs,
Christmas pageants and the like? This is where much of the real
issue exists today. If the Establishment Clause were cut back to only
a rule against coercive impositions of religion by government, and if
coercion were interpreted to mean only physical force or formal
sanctions,' 9 then there would be much less political controversy.
this part of the Swaggart opinion).
17. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that a Sunday closing law did not violate the free exercise
rights of an Orthodox Jewish merchant where religion required him to close on Saturday and law
required him to close on Sunday).
18. Daniel 0. Conkle, God Loveth Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 339, 346 (1992).
19. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-60 (1992) (recognizing coercive pressure
to participate in prayer at graduation ceremony), with id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recog-
nizing coercion only if imposed "by force of law and threat of penalty"), For an analysis of why
[Vol. 42:373
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So, what are the benefits of a rule against all government-spon-
sored religious observances? What are the reasons for a rule that
government cannot even persuade about religion, cannot engage in
religious observances, and cannot display religious symbols, even if
it's not coercing anybody?
I will begin my response by saying that if I had to give up one of
the rights in the First Amendment, this is the one I would give up.
A rule against government persuasion or influence is less critical
than a rule against government coercion. In terms of history, in
terms of comparative law, and in terms of what the rest of the world
does, the Establishment Clause is an extraordinary protection. We
would probably still be a free society without it. But I at least would
mourn the loss. Repeal of our protection against religious persuasion
by government would be a serious loss for reasons that have already
been mentioned by other speakers at this conference. I review those
reasons briefly.
First is the harm it would bring to religious minorities, whose
faith will not be the one that the government observes and whose
symbols will not be displayed. These minorities include nonbelievers
- atheists, agnostics, and the wholly indifferent - but also believ-
ers in the extraordinary array of minority faiths in this country. Jus-
tice O'Connor described this harm in principle, although she can
never recognize it when she sees it.2" Government observance of the
majority religion does indeed tell religious minorities that they are
outsiders and not fully accepted members of the community.
Those who think government ought to be able to engage in reli-
gious rituals and display religious symbols might ask: "What is the
problem? We see ideas that offend us all the time. Political dissent-
ers who are seriously alienated from the policies of the Bush Admin-
istration are told that they are second class citizens in the same
sense as offended religious minorities. If no one thinks it unconstitu-
tional that the government lets political dissenters know it does not
care about their views, what is so different about religion?" What is
different is that on matters of governmental policy, somebody has to
rule. This polity has decided that it should be the majority, but it
the majority has the more realistic understanding of coercion, see Douglas Laycock, "Noncoer-
cive'" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U.L.
REV. 37, 67-68 (1991).
20. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that a
government endorsement of one religion sends a message of exclusion to others, but that a govern-
ment display of a creche does not endorse Christianity).
1992]
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must inevitably be someone. The government must make decisions
about political matters.
In the case of religion, no one has to rule. There is no need for the
government to make decisions about Christian rituals versus Jewish
rituals versus no religious rituals at all. For government to make
that choice is simply a gratuitous statement about the kind of people
we really are. By making such statements, the government says the
real American religion is watered-down Christianity, and everybody
else is a little bit un-American.
It is also relevant here that people suffer more when you take
away something they have come to think of as their own than if you
never give it to them in the first place. After forty years of telling
religious minorities in this country that it is part of their rights that
the government will not engage in school prayer and in public reli-
gious observance, the harm of overruling all those cases at this point
would be more severe than if the issue had been decided the other
way from the beginning.
The other set of harms from noncoercive establishments is to the
religious majority. It is not good for religion to have government
engaged in religious rituals. Government by its sheer size and prom-
inence will have a disproportionate influence on the kinds of rituals
that are exercised and on public perception of what are appropriate
rituals. The result will not be pretty. Government-sponsored religion
is theologically and liturgically thin. It is politically compliant. It is
supportive of incumbent administrations. In intolerant communities,
it inevitably tends to impose the majority's forms, rituals, and termi-
nology on everybody. In tolerant communities, efforts to be all-inclu-
sive inevitably lead to desacralization, to the least common denomi-
nator, to a secular incarnation with plastic reindeer, to Christmas
and Chanukah mushed together as the Winter Holidays.21 By strip-
ping all the specific elements of different faiths and denominations
and attempting to keep only the common elements that all faiths
share, tolerant governments produce a mishmash that no faith can
accept or believe in. It has always been a great puzzle to me why
certain elements of the religious community invest so much effort in
demanding that government model bad religion in this way. There
21. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1990)
("[B]oth Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained
a secular status in our society."). For further analysis of the harm to religion, see Laycock, supra
note 19, at 61-65.
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are serious costs to these government religious observances.
Finally, it is occasionally suggested that the Establishment Clause
helps keep religion out of politics. Simply put, that is nonsense. As
history clearly demonstrates, religion is always a part of politics. I
think Daniel Conkle offered more or less the right distinction.22
What the Establishment Clause separates from government is theol-
ogy, worship, and ritual, the aspects of religion that relate only to
things outside the jurisdiction of government. Questions of morality,
of right conduct, of proper treatment of our fellow humans, are
questions to which both church and state have historically spoken.
They are questions within the jurisdiction of both. In a democratic
society, the state will ultimately decide these questions at least to
the extent of deciding what conduct will be subject to legal sanc-
tions. But these are also questions on which churches are absolutely
entitled to speak.
For better or worse, churches have always spoken on these issues.
Those who think that religion and religious believers should be kept
out of politics should reflect on abolition. Those who think that there
are no risks of religion intruding into politics should meditate on
Prohibition. There are good stories and bad stories about religious
participation in politics. The bad stories are about intolerance and
failure to accommodate differing views in a pluralistic society; but
there are equally bad stories about secular movements of all sorts.
In a society where a David Duke can be taken seriously as a candi-
date for president, I am not uniquely or especially worried about
religious participation in politics.
22. Conkle, supra note 18, at 345-46.
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